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Property in the Anthropocene
J. Peter Byrne1
Human-induced climate change threatens perilous risks for our physical homes. It also poses a
serious challenge to our legal institutions. Several scholars already have remarked on the disruption
climate change has brought to specific legal areas, such as tort, standing, and national security. This
essay argues that climate change will also disrupt fundamental ideas about real property. Prior work has
explored the need for fresh approaches to land use regulation and a shift in regulatory takings law. This
essay looks at the more fundamental assumptions and principles of property law. It maintains that the
growing need for human management of dynamic natural forces, distorted by greenhouse gas
emissions, will erode the foundations of physical stability and owner autonomy that shape basic
doctrines of property law.
A firm scientific consensus holds that human-induced emissions of greenhouse gases, such as
carbon dioxide and methane, into the atmosphere have been, and will continue, working
unprecedented changes in our climate.2 The effects of such emissions are apparent in phenomena such
as global warming, rising sea levels, aggravated drought and wildfires, and more extreme storms and
flooding.3 Legislative efforts to reduce emissions and rationally address these threats have been
stymied at the national level and in many states by a combination of entrenched interests, discounting
of future risks, conceptual complexity, and existential fear. Nonetheless, some states and many local
governments have begun planning and have even taken significant steps to reduce emissions and
prepare for inevitable environmental changes.4
Courts, too, have begun to alter legal doctrines to address or accommodate the effects of
climate change. The Supreme Court arguably expanded its approach to standing in order to allow a state
to sue the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions,5
and a federal district court recently surely did the same by allowing a group of minors to sue the United
States for failing to address climate change.6 Legal scholars have noted that climate change has
disrupted established doctrines in other areas of law. Douglas Kysar, for example, has written about tort
law: “Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A wrongfully, directly, and exclusively injures B, tort
law seems fundamentally ill-equipped to address the causes and impacts of climate change .… courts in
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all likelihood will agree with commentators that nuisance and other traditional tort theories are
overwhelmed by the magnitude and the complexity of the climate change conundrum.”7 Many statutory
areas are straining to meet the challenges of climate change as well. 8
It stands to reason that property law, which deals directly with the rights and duties of
ownership of elements of the natural world, also will be disrupted by climate change.9 This essay will
focus on real property law, which historically has assumed stability in the physical world and the
capacity of an owner to exercise effective dominion over land.10 Climate change calls both these
assumptions into question because many parcels of land will teeter on physical convulsions, and
government help will more frequently be needed to keep such forces at bay. The essay considers three
types of changes in property law principles: growth of publicly as opposed to privately owned land,
greater scope for land use regulation, and government liability for management mistakes. The changes
will not occur immediately; the effects of climate change have begun to show themselves, but more
dramatic changes lie in the future. Property law is a conservative field, guarding reliance. But over time
its tenets adapt to a changing physical and social environment.11 This essay is, frankly, speculative,
aiming to stimulate discussion and further research.
First, changes in property law will be brought about because sea-level rise, enhanced storms,
and fire will physically destroy or degrade many parcels of land and their improvements. Some coastal
areas will simply sink beneath the waves, engulfing the homes built upon them. More properties will be
destroyed by intense storms, such as hurricanes strengthened by climate change—as happened in
Hurricane Sandy—or by growing wild fires in the increasingly arid west. Market forces have not yet
seriously guarded against these losses.12 The National Flood Insurance Program, 13although insolvent
without the backing of the U.S. government,14 continues to provide assistance where the premiums do
not cover the risk. Developers build and sell new homes along the shore within shorter timeframes than
the timeline for losses from climate change, perhaps even aggravating their incentives to develop
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coastal land in the fastest possible schedule. Sellers of existing coastal buildings and realtors
compensated by a percentage of the sales price retain every incentive to remain silent about the risks of
sea-level rise. Mortgage lenders who bundle and sell mortgage-debt packages to investors collect fees
and retain no continued exposure to loss. The investors in bundled mortgage-debt instruments have
their risks diluted by the scale of other mortgages making up their exposure. Local governments at the
coast typically rely on real property taxes and probably hesitate to require warnings that could crash
property values. Buyers should attend to risk but often are distracted by more immediate concerns such
as securing mortgage funds or keeping insurance premiums low.15 Thus, without strong regulatory
intervention, much development could be destroyed, yet regulation has been slow to evolve.
This reality will drive changes in property rules that may have made sense on the assumption
that nature was stable but seem absurd in the dynamic context of climate change. Climate change will
not amount to a move from one relatively stable state to another; change at a rate faster than historic
norms will continue for the foreseeable future, regardless of when emissions of greenhouse gases can
be significantly reduced. Moreover, even the rate of change will not be constant but probably will
continue to accelerate, as scientists have observed in recent years.16 Thus, rules about land use will
exist in a state of physical flux, even though historically land law has assumed, even relied upon,
perpetual stability. The entire edifice of estates in land, future interests, and perpetuities, for example,
assumes practically that the land lasts forever as, to differing degrees, do the laws of mortgages,
prescription, and conservation easements.
Some aspects of land law will not be able to survive the changes. One example is the significant
but obscure principle that a property owner enjoys a right of access to the public highway system, and
government action eliminating such access amounts to a taking requiring the payment of compensation
for the reduction in value of the marooned land.17 Recently, this rule has been found appropriate to
support a takings action against a local government based upon its failure to maintain a road
connecting a barrier island that had repeatedly flooded.18 As seas rise and floods increase, however, the
burden that such a rule places on the public fisc becomes irrational; no government constructs roads
and bridges on the assumption that the facilities would have to be continually rebuilt to higher
elevations and mounting costs. Also, the traditional rule creates perverse incentives for coastal
homeowners who may rationally seek to recover the value of their flooding homes by bringing takings
claims. While it may be that courts, appalled by the prospect of sea-level rise, may grow more rigid and
formalistic in their application of this rule in the short run, they will need to revise it as cases and costs
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multiply with losses. Doctrinal change could be applied either to the easement of access or to the
takings analysis.19
Not only will sea-level rise physically destroy or damage land and improvements, but private
property rights themselves will be terminated. Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the public owns
the beds of tidelands seaward of the mean-high-tide line. As the tide line moves landward, the doctrine
of accretion will transform private dry land into public subsurface, wetland, or tideland.20 No taking
requiring the payment of compensation is effected, because the transformation is considered to have
been accomplished by nature not by the government.21 Then, if the government steps in to restore the
sunken land, as when the government rebuilds a beach with dredged sand, the restored beach usually is
considered public property.22 This result stems from the doctrine of avulsion, whereby a sudden change
in the tide line, even if purposefully brought about by a government agency, does not change the
boundary line—though a gradual change would under the doctrine of accretion. The justification for the
result under avulsion, however, may be due to the public resources used to rebuild the beach.
Pertinently, Professor Flourney has recently inquired whether sea-level rise should change the
application of the accretion/avulsion approach. Historically, the justice of this rule was based upon the
bidirectional and unpredictable movement of the tide line, but now sea-level rise will push the tide line
inexorably inland.23 Professor Flourney persuasively shows that both the physical assumptions and
policy justifications for the traditional approach have changed significantly because of sea-level rise and
argues generally for greater protection for free-access submerged and tidal lands subject to the public
trust.
Second, large scale government investments in protecting private property from the effects of
climate change likely will increase the scope and weight of the public interest, justifying regulation of
private land use. Sea-level rise again provides the clearest instance of this. There are three categories of
regulatory responses to adapt to sea-level rise: fight, accommodate, and retreat.24 Fighting involves the
public or private construction of physical barriers or drains to keep sea waters away from private
property. Thus, sea walls, levees, dune and wetland construction, pumps, and drains can forestall
inundation or storm surges (up to a point).25 This approach has obvious attractions, especially if the
public will pay for the new infrastructure, because it preserves the current boundaries of the lot and
extant buildings and generally allows established land uses to continue. Public infrastructure has an
additional crucial advantage over private efforts because it can be constructed across property lines
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according to the physical characteristics of the site. But there are engineering, environmental, and
economic limits to the capacity of government to build such protections.26
Such large-scale public investments, both of money and expertise, must expand the scope of
regulatory power that government may exercise over the protected private property. When government
has built sophisticated infrastructure at public expense to protect private property, its interest in that
property must grow. One cannot consider the private owner as enjoying “sole and despotic dominion”27
when her property would be destroyed without public expenditure and management. One might argue
that from an economic perspective, the public has put equity into the protected property to preserve its
market value. Moreover, to the extent that government has prevented the tide line from moving
landward, it has suspended its future ownership rights over the private land it is now protecting. The
public’s right to regulate the use of protected private land for environmental benefits or to mandate
forms of public access surely will grow. Of course, it always has been the case that government action
has been necessary to secure property rights through judicial and executive enforcement of such rights,
but the financing, construction, and maintenance of physical barriers to natural destruction of private
property go far beyond any “night watchman” type of state action and toward a persistent “control of
nature.”28
Some indication of how courts may reshape property doctrines may be gleaned from the
unanimous post–Hurricane Sandy decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Borough of Harvey
Cedars v. Karan.29 The Borough condemned a perpetual easement over a portion of the Karan’s
shorefront lot for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to construct, largely at federal expense, a dune
barrier to storms and erosions. In calculating the compensation to be paid, the trial court permitted the
jury to consider the obstruction of the view from the house but not the benefit accruing from increased
storm and erosion protection, on the ground that such protection was general to many protected
properties. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that any “reasonably
calculable benefits—regardless of whether those benefits are enjoyed to some lesser or greater degree
by others in the community—that increase the value of property at the time of the taking should be
discounted from the condemnation award.”30 The court rejected as outdated the traditional distinction
between specific benefits to the retained property, which can be considered, and benefits general to the
community, which cannot.31
Harvey Cedars found absurd the traditional approach, which considers offsetting benefits in
compensation calculations, when faced with a large government project to protect private homes from
the sea. The Court did not abandon protection of private property; it presumed the right of the owners
to compensation for the easement and affirmed the propriety of compensation for impairment of their
ocean view. But mandating consideration of off benefits may practically eliminate and certainly will
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radically reduce payment of compensation for such a project.32 The State of New Jersey is aggressively
using Harvey Cedars as a point in negotiating the donation of easements for dune construction. The
increase in sea-level rise caused by climate change will greatly increase the risk to shorefront property
and the pressure for protective public works, while rendering less persuasive the claims of property
owners’ recognition of the niceties of their rights. None of this means that New Jersey’s dune
construction project or any particular government property protection scheme is a sensible or fair
response to climate risks. But the logic of such public protection will be to make property more
amenable to public control.
There are many things that may be required of protected property owners: public access on dry
sand beaches, public access for maintenance of works, owner maintenance of habitats or wetlands,
water management, protection of viewsheds, and the like. At a minimum, government’s physical
protection of private property against sea-level rise should, as a constitutional matter, authorize any
regulation or public access reasonably necessary to realize public benefits from managing sea-level rise.
Government regulations to require property-owner accommodations to climate change could
lead to extensive additions to building codes and site plans, but they do not seem constitutionally or
conceptually difficult. New houses on lots threatened by sea-level rise may be required to be elevated or
placed upon high ground; landscaping or water engineering may be mandated for those threatened by
wildfires.33 While these may increase costs, courts are unlikely to take seriously due process or
regulatory takings challenges to a wide range of accommodation regulations.
More problematic are regulations requiring retreat. From an environmental perspective, the
best response to sea-level rise, drought, and fire threat would be to simply prohibit new development in
the areas most at risk. The reasons to mandate retreat from areas at risk from climate change include
protection of residents from harm, avoidance of dangerous and expensive rescue efforts, coordination
of cessations of public services, and minimization of damage to ecosystem services.34 But the economic
effects of such bans could be devastating for investors and even for local government finances. More
immediately, they risk triggering the per se rule of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, that land use
regulations that eliminate all the economic value of a parcel constitute regulatory takings.35 The peculiar
threat of Lucas is that it requires compensation unless the use of the land would constitute a nuisance at
common law. In the case of sea-level rise or other environmental threats, however, traditional nuisance
law is inapplicable. According to the Restatement, a nuisance arises from an owner’s unreasonable use
of his land that causes harm to another landowner or to the public at large.36 Nuisance law can
(imperfectly) address environmental harm when the defendant is polluting neighbors from his own land.
32
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But it would seem not to address situations where the risk stems from changes in nature that are caused
by human activity throughout the industrialized world. In Lucas, where a taking was found from a
prohibition of building within a flood zone, Justice Scalia noted derisively that construction of a single
family house does not constitute a nuisance.37 In practice, retreat has been limited to generous
voluntary buyouts of homes after destruction from floods or fires. 38
So to mandate retreat through legislation, the Lucas facts must be avoided, the doctrine must
bend, or nuisance law must expand. In a prior article, I discussed avoiding the factual premise of Lucas
through rolling-development restrictions, which permit development for time but then prohibit it when
the sea rises to within a certain distance of a dwelling or building site.39 In another article, I have
described climate exactions, which might permit such development but at a price that reflects the
environmental or public costs it generates.40 Here, I briefly want to suggest that at some point
maintaining a house in the face of sea-level rise or other increasing climate risks may be considered a
public nuisance.
A public nuisance would be the unreasonable use of property that imposes significant harm on
the public generally.41 In the era before comprehensive land use regulation, local governments enacted
ordinances identifying certain uses in certain locations as public nuisances; public authorities such as
attorney generals or corporation councils would bring actions to enforce such ordinances through
injunctions.42 In some cases, land uses thought reasonable at one time came to be seen as nuisances
when the environs around them had changed. For example, a cement plant in Los Angeles was
unobjectionable when settlement was sparse but was deemed a nuisance when a neighborhood of
houses grew up around it.43 People building or living in houses could come to be considered nuisances
when the risk of inundation, storm surges, or fire reaches a threshold where disaster assistance would
become too dangerous or costly, when they threaten failure of septic or sewer systems, or when
construction prevents migration inland of environmental systems providing the community with
important ecological services. Of course, the actual factual circumstances and the normative meanings
that the public attaches to nuisances in the future would be determinative, but climate change could so
change which land uses are considered reasonable that such “essential uses” as building a house could
become nuisances in many locations. 44
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The third category of property law change to be expected from climate change would be an
increase in government liability for losses resulting from its environmental management. Currently
losses from extreme natural events, such as hurricanes, generally are considered “acts of God,” for
which no entity is primarily responsible. If government has no authority and makes no effort to control
the forces of nature, there is no legal basis to hold it accountable for natural disasters.45 But when
government comes to manage the effects of climate change, through construction of levees, for
example, courts may come to hold the government responsible for its mistakes or inadequate
precautions. Thus, if reconstructed sand dunes erode faster than estimated and a storm surge destroys
houses in the locality, or forests thinned of overgrown or dead vegetation still host raging wildfires that
consume homes, the government may be blamed. Lawyers for private owners bearing such losses may
seek to hold the government liable.
This tendency is evident in recent court decisions using the Takings Clause to facilitate liability
on the United States for its management of flooding on the Mississippi River. Since the 1920s the US
Army Corps of Engineers has been tasked with reducing flooding as well as aiding navigation on the
river. The legislation authorizing their flood control efforts also contained a statutory exemption from
government tort liability arising from such efforts.46 But flooding of private land near the river still
results from the enormity of the task, whether from inadequate water management or from agency
choices among competing constituents. In recent years, courts have expanded the basis upon which
the Corps can be held liable for flooding under the Takings Clause, which cannot be limited by statute. In
Arkansas Fish and Game, the Supreme Court departed from prior law in holding that a takings claim can
be based upon a single or finite series of flooding events.47 Subsequently, the U.S. Claims Court held that
the Corps effected a taking by its construction and negligent management of the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet, which enhanced the flooding in St. Bernard Parish from Hurricane Katrina.48
Of course, the government has never managed coastlines with the thoroughness that the Corps
has managed the Mississippi River. But the vulnerability of coastal property to sea-level rise suggests
that government may play a much larger role in defending against rising seas to preserve private
property values. In doing so, it would seem to take on a duty to perform its many protective functions
without negligence. Because the government would be choosing structures to prevent the risks foreseen
by sophisticated scientific analyses, it seems inevitable that sometimes the government would be wrong
in its predictions or would engineer inadequately based on mistakes, inadequate findings, or the sheer
difficulty of the task. To be sure, government can find some defense in the discretionary function
immunity to the Federal Tort Claims Act, but generally speaking this immunity extends only to
intentional and not negligent acts of government employees.49
Government will also be threatened with liability for its intentional decisions about protection
from climate effects through takings claims. The scale of climate effects and the immensity of affected
45
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areas means that government will protect some areas and not others.50 Choices will need to be made
about limited resources and know-how, and likely will be based on the value of protecting different
places.51 For example, urban areas are more likely to be protected than rural. Physical characteristics of
some places, such as land subsidence or porous bedrock, may make some places much more difficult or
expensive to protect. Politics also inevitably will play a role. Thus, government will make imperfect and
unpopular decisions about which localities will be protected from flooding, which will be allowed to
flood, and which the government will intentionally flood in order to divert flood waters. . Losers will
seek compensation. Such cases will be brought as takings because the decisions to flood or not protect
from flooding will be characterized as intentional implementations of policies.
The structure of such a problem can be seen in the Quebedeaux case.52 There the Corps
estimated that high water descending from the Mississippi would overflow levees in Baton Rouge and
New Orleans, so it opened the Morganza Spillway, diverting floodwaters into the Atchafalya River basin
and destroying numerous farms, homes, and businesses. Affected landowners sued, claiming a taking.
The Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Judge Allegra relied on the recent decision in Arkansas Fish and Game53 to hold that a single instance of
intentional flooding could be found to be a taking and also rejected the government’s argument that a
flooding victim who benefited from a flood control project could not recover unless he showed that the
cost of the flooding exceeded the benefits from the project as a whole.54 Thus, flood victims who would
have had to bear their own losses if the government had taken no action could obtain compensation if
the government chose to flood them in order to avoid a greater disaster downstream.
Government engineering may never reach the level of control over coastal flooding that the
Corps has reached on the Mississippi, but one can easily imagine that government choices over which
areas it will protect against ocean storm surges may result in similar takings claims—for example,
government construction or permitting of a seawall to protect residences in one location along the Gulf
Coast, knowing that such a seawall may increase the likelihood of erosion or flooding on nearby
farmland. There may be subtle issues of causation raised regarding the extent to which the government
or nature caused the loss,55 but the breadth of government control we can anticipate to protect owners
from the effects of climate change suggests that at some point losses may be attributed to the
government. Professor Serkin has put this scenario at the center of his theory of passive takings:
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The public needs to have the authority to regulate or prohibit the private construction of sea walls to protect
neighboring properties as well as tidelands. Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed, supra note 21, at 100-04. A common
law rule, already weakened, that sea-level rise should eliminate is the “common enemy” rule permitting
landowners to fend off flood waters in any direction without liability to neighbors injured by the redirected waters.
See generally Daniel H. Cole, Liability Rules for Surface Water Drainage: A Simple Economic Analysis, 12 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 35 (1990).
51
See JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE (1989).
52
Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013).
53
Id., at 324-25 (discussing Arkansas Fish & Game Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012)).
54
Id., at 321.
55
See Teagarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252 (1998) (rejecting takings claim on the ground that the forest fire
caused destruction of the plaintiffs’ trees rather than the United States Forest Service’s choice to not protect the
plaintiffs’ property).
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“Whether the government prohibits or builds sea walls, its near-total control over the allocation of the
inevitable harm serves as a doctrinal hook for passive takings liability.”56
Thus, we can anticipate that government will be entrusted with the choice over which private
property will be protected at great government expense and which will be flooded. Several property
doctrines may protect the government from takings liability in such circumstances. In Miller v. Schoene,
the Supreme Court held that a Virginia statute mandating the destruction of cedar trees to protect the
state’s apple trees from a contagious plant disease did not amount to a taking because the government
had to act to prevent harm in circumstances where the failure to act would have caused more harm.57
From one view, the decision increases the probability that government failure to protect an owner could
amount to a taking because the Court seems to treat government action and inaction as equal policy
choices that can cause harm. But more fundamentally, the Court expressly stated that “it is obvious that
there may be, and that here there is, a preponderant public interest in the preservation of one interest
over the other.” Thus even in cases where government action causes harm, as when opening a
floodgate, the government may escape takings liability when not doing so could cause a greater harm to
the public. The vitality of Miler v. Schoene in modern takings law, however, is questionable, as it relies
on a deference to the police power that the Supreme Court has moved away from.58
This essay has considered ways that climate change may push changes in property law. Sealevel rise, flooding, fire, and drought undermine the stability of improvements to land and, indeed, of
land itself. Managing these increased risks will lead to greater government construction and
management of protective infrastructure. Paradoxically, greater public physical protections will both
expand the regulatory reach of government and expose government to increased liability for property
damage from events historically considered “natural” but that will become seen as the results of
government choice or negligence. This fundamental change in the relationship between government
and private property owners will bring significant change to the property law in some ways suggested
here and in other ways not yet anticipated.
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Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 394
(2014).
57
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
58
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (1992) (“The ‘harmful or noxious uses’ principle was
the Court's early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings
Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate—a reality we nowadays
acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police power.”). Another obscure corner of
takings law that will come into play when the government assumes control of nature are cases of actual necessity,
such as when government blows up buildings to prevent the spread of fire. See, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S.
16 (1880). This exception to takings liability is narrow and has not been revisited in many years.
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